Invasion of the electoral system, adulteration of acts and falsification of signatures in the OAS report – eju.tv

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This early morning was the preliminary report of more than 30 experts accredited by the Organization of American States, which must be binding in Bolivia, according to the commitment made between the Government and the general secretariat of that body. Among the conclusions of the document it is said bluntly that Evo Morales was likely to have won the elections, but it is unlikely that he would have done so with more than 10% difference in relation to Carlos Mesa. Therefore, a new national election with new members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is recommended.

Unlikely first-round win

OAS experts question the results of the last 5% of the computation, equivalent to 290,402 minutes. With graphics, they show an unusual entry of minutes from a server not authorized by the TSE, but which broke into the electoral system knowing the TSE, the company providing the Neotec software and the auditing company.

It indicates that after the calculation of 95% there is a very ascending curve of results in favor of the MAS and that the votes of the Citizen Community crumble. That is to say, of 290,402 votes, 60% were counted in favor of the MAS and 23.8% in favor of the Citizen Community, which the report considers an "unusual behavior". That – concludes the document – makes it unlikely that Evo Morales had obtained more than 10% advantage over the second candidate that was Carlos Mesa.

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Adulteration of minutes and forgery of signatures

OAS experts question the results of the last 5% of the computation, equivalent to 290,402 minutes. With graphics, they show an unusual entry of minutes from a server not authorized by the TSE, but which broke into the electoral system knowing the TSE, the company providing the Neotec software and the auditing company.

It indicates that after the calculation of 95% there is a very ascending curve of results in favor of the MAS and that the votes of the Citizen Community crumble. That is to say, of 290,402 votes, 60% were counted in favor of the MAS and 23.8% in favor of the Citizen Community, which the report considers an "unusual behavior". That – concludes the document – makes it unlikely that Evo Morales had obtained more than 10% advantage over the second candidate that was Carlos Mesa.

Irregular electoral computation

There are 14 observations on the official calculation. The OAS concludes that the process did not follow good practices or respect safety standards, so it concludes that integrity cannot be guaranteed or the results can be guaranteed.

They mention that in the face of weak income control, anyone could access to have administrator roles to the software used, since for example one person could start many sessions with their data, among other insecurities. They confirm the observation of the aforementioned audit firm that the security protocol was violated twice after zeroing the database to begin receiving the minutes. The integrity of the software used was not respected and data reception was not even initiated in a ‘sterile’ environment. That means that test information (before the elections) was mixed with official information from the electoral records.

Despite the serious violations of the TREP, data from this system were used in the case of 1575 minutes for official calculation.

He also notes that the software provider, the company Neotec, entered the official computer server remotely and is also the only one that has the domain of access, which damages the chain of custody.

The report considers it "unacceptable" that during the electoral process the database was accessed directly, with the argument of "undoing" minutes.

THE TREP

OAS technicians found not one, but several irregularities that conclude that "the results of the TREP cannot be given certainty."

They found the use of two servers outside the electoral system; that is, they were not monitored by the TSE technicians or by the auditing company. One of them was used for information traffic to TREP workstations; the other received all the information from the TREP. The report indicates that no one reported to this team despite the fact that the TSE knew of its existence.

They also detected that the information in the minutes came from servers that mocked the control of the audit firm and this was done after the data transmission was interrupted (which was questioned by the Observer Mission from the outset). Not only was a foreign device used, but the IP of the 350 servers responsible for receiving the information was modified. The report points to this point as "extremely serious."

The servers were also not used in the way that was foreseen in the protocol, which means that they do not have the same information and that "is at odds with good practices." He notes that no document describes what happened the night the data was received and the subsequent interruption of the transmission, nor about those responsible for such actions.

The OAS questions that the metadata or the data of the photographs of the minutes are not preserved and the application used did not limit the date of sending the data, which means that data were received with dates before the same day of the election.

In sum, the TREP data did not have 100% monitoring and the data transmission infrastructure was under the control of the head of the Sereci.

Chain of Custody Issues

The OAS experts traveled to five departments to verify the chain of custody of the voting records. They also investigated the votes abroad. They found inconsistency of results in Argentina. “From the previous analysis it is highlighted that, of the 176 minutes of the sample that had been scrutinized in Argentina, 38.07% presented inconsistencies with the number of citizens who paid. That is, the minutes reflected a greater number of votes than the total in the index lists, ”the report said.

They observe that in the departments of Chuquisaca and Potosi, the scrutiny of minutes was carried out in places other than those established and that for the transfer of the minutes the party delegates were not informed, so they could not witness the verification of the minutes of departmental calculations. Nor did they find documents certifying that this electoral material was monitored by the security forces: FFAA and Police, despite an inter-institutional agreement signed between the TSE and these organizations.

The burning of minutes in four departments, says the document, that there was no adequate chain of custody to preserve the electoral records, which is considered a “critical factor” to give guarantees to the electoral process.

DUTY / Monica Patricia Salvatierra Soruco



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